A Broken Georgian Dream

Special thanks to the co-author of this article, Stacey Ngiam.

A banner on a Tbilisi street proclaims that Russia is a terrorist state. Image credit: Sharan

The Georgian dream, ironically, is the end of the Georgian Dream Party’s rule as well as the full European Union (EU) membership of the Caucasian state. Since 2023, Georgian citizens have demonstrated against the Georgian Dream Party’s Foreign Influence Law in a series of protests which have repeatedly rocked the nation in the past few months as the European Council officially announced a halt on the accession process on 9 July 2024.

To understand the European Council’s decisions, we must first explore Georgia’s historical relationship with the EU. Once a member of the Soviet Union from 1921 till the fall of the Union in 1991, Georgia has been established as an eastern-influenced state, more closely aligned with Russia/Soviet Union. This directly contradicts the democratic, capitalist values of which the EU prides itself for. As a result, since independence, the EU has made it clear that extensive political reforms and the restoration of civil liberties such as fair elections and freedom of speech were the minimum requirements for Georgia to even be considered for accession. 

In December 2023, the EU officially approved Georgia’s candidacy status, setting Georgia on track to becoming the next EU member once required reforms were implemented. This was a dream come true for 89% of Georgians, according to a 2024 International Republican Institute survey. To Georgians, joining the EU signifies a shift to a truly democratic regime, and greater EU assistance for social reforms such as educational and healthcare reforms which can greatly improve the standard of living for Gerogians. 

Georgia's EU membership aspirations are enshrined in Article 78 of its constitution. Image credit: Sharan

Yet, the accession process was effectively halted in July 2024 following recent legislative developments in the state - the recent passing of a “Foreign Influence” bill (mass protests forced the shelving of a previous attempt in March 2023) has reignited concerns that an emboldened Ivanishvili is increasingly turning to Kremlin-style legislation to consolidate his party’s grip on Georgian society, straight out of Russia’s authoritarian playbook. Supposedly promoting increased transparency for organisations operating within Georgia that benefit from foreign funding, the law mandates that all NGOs and media organisations that receive more than 20% of their funding from foreign sources register in a government database. Failure to register or adequately complete a series of onerous reporting requirements on the origin of funds attracts fines of up to US$9300. In justifying the bill’s reintroduction, Ivanishvili accused foreign NGOs of attempting to “organise a revolution” and vowed to punish the opposition United National Movement party that ruled Georgia until 2012 prior to Georgian Dream. Georgian Dream supporters also cited similarities with the United States Foreign Agents Registration Act in defending the bill as a necessary tool to keep foreign interests in check - debunked by the European Commission for Democracy through Law (Venice Commission) as the US law primarily targets lobbyists and branches of foreign political parties instead of clamping down on civil society. 

The final nail to the coffin was the parliamentary elections on 26 October 2024 where Georgian Dream secured 53.9% of votes through rampant fraudulent behaviours such as vote buying, intimidation and even Russian disinformation according to the Organisation for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE). To make matters worse, the Georgian Dream had even vowed to ban opposition parties if they won a significant majority, which in effect would officially end the multi-party democratic system Georgia strives towards in bid for EU membership.

A Thinning Tightrope 

As demonstrations in Tbilisi enter the second week and pockets of resistance emerge across Georgia, many have noticed an uncanny resemblance to Ukraine’s Maidan Uprising that began on the same week 11 years ago. Then pro-Russian president Yanukovych torched an unprecedented wave of protests when he declined to sign the EU-Ukraine Association Agreement, a treaty designed to introduce extensive economic reforms that would closely align Ukraine to prevailing EU regulatory standards. Merely days after Yanukovych was deposed in February 2014 (he later fled to Russia), Russia seized Crimea amidst the resultant power vacuum, eventually setting the preconditions for the invasion in 2022. 

A controversial political advertisement for Georgian Dream. Image credit: RadioFreeEurope/RadioLiberty

It is precisely this fear that Georgian Dream has sought to capitalise on ahead of the elections. Campaign billboards juxtaposing the ruins of a Ukrainian war zone and a prosperous Georgia have emerged as part of an extensive advertising campaign blanketing Tbilisi, alluding to a potentially catastrophic invasion of Georgia if it strays too far. Evidently, Ivanishvili has given up on walking the thinning tightrope and chosen the easy way out by gravitating towards the Kremlin. The horrors of the 2008 Russo-Georgian War remains fresh in the minds of many: over a span of 16 days, Russia annexed Abkhazia and South Ossetia (that together account for around 20% of Georgian territory) and continues to maintain a large military presence in both breakaway regions till date. Cut off from Tbilisi, the regions are almost entirely dependent on Moscow for economic support. Many are concerned that Russia could use a similar pretext to commence another invasion should Tbilisi warm up to the West or even take steps towards joining NATO. In defense of its pro-Russian stance, Georgian Dream has repeated far-fetched claims that Putin would reward Georgia by revoking its recognition of the 2 territories and allow Georgia to reabsorb them. For now, Putin has maintained a policy of deliberate ambiguity and deferred to the eventual decision of the Abkhaz and South Ossetian people. In any case, Russia would not be easily persuaded to dismantle its extensive military infrastructure in the separatist regions either. 

A heavy police presence is seen as crowds gather near the Assembly Building. Image credit: Sharan

What next? On 28 November, the European Parliament passed a resolution that contained its strongest condemnation yet, censuring Georgian Dream for the democratic backsliding of the country under its watch and declaring that the election results were invalid. Members of the European Parliament have also called for EU sanctions on Georgian government officials as well as a suspension of EU-level engagement with the incumbent government. Earlier this year, the US suspended a US$95m grant and slapped dozens of officials with travel restrictions. However, Ivanishvili remains in firm control of Georgia. For now, Brussels has remained silent on the possibility of imposing EU-wide sanctions even as shocking reports emerge of police brutality against opposition figures, journalists and pretty much everyone involved in a demonstration. Regardless, Hungary is likely to strongly oppose such a measure, given Orbán’s close relationship with Ivanishvili - both lead governments that have embraced increasingly authoritarian leanings. Without a concerted effort by the international community, Ivanishvili’s efforts to crush civil society will succeed unopposed. 

A broken Georgian Dream shatters the aspirations of 3 million in this country. Can the EU act before it’s too late? 

References

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