This article is co-authored by Luo Xuhong and Stacey Ngiam.
The al-Assad family’s stranglehold on Syria’s political landscape has ended after 5 decades of rule since 1971. On 8 December 2024, former Syrian President, Bashar al-Assad fled Damascus to Moscow, mere hours before the fall of the regime to the rebels.
A Look at the Dictator: the Syrian Civil War
It all starts from the Arab Springs Revolution in 2011, a series of anti-government protests and uprisings which started in Tunisia, soon spreading throughout the Arab world.
Specifically in Syria, these demonstrations were a manifestation of long entrenched unhappiness with the dire economic state of Syria, further compounded by corruption and a lack of political freedom, conditions Bashar al-Assad inherited from his father, Hafez. In a Muslim majority country, the Assads came from the Alawi minority, a Shia sect (a Muslim sect) historically persecuted in Syria until the post World War I French Mandate. The religious tensions had hence created a foundation for dissent and tensions that have grown over the years.
In response to rising demonstrations, the Syrian government used force to crack down on dissent, only to be faced by waves of armed rebel groups further challenging the Assad regime, turning an uprising into a full-scale civil war. Over the years, Assad’s regime was propped up by the Lebanon Hezbollah group and the Iranian Revolutionary Guard Corps in 2013 followed by Russian support since 2015, providing necessary military aid to resist the rebel forces. From the indiscriminate use of violence to the deployment of chemical weapons (a clear violation of international law), Assad’s regime had used various means to maintain its grip on power.
Yet, these attempts proved futile in changing the minds of the people. Eventually culminating in the rise of hardline Islamist groups and even ISIS and other extremist factions.
The Fall of Damascus
Given the dire situation in Syria for over a decade, a coalition of opposition fighters finally launched a major offensive, Operation Deterrence of Aggression, against pro-government forces. Led by Hayat Tahrir al-Sham (HTS), an Islamist militant group, the operation swiftly advanced into Syria’s second-largest city, Aleppo, and soon entered the cities of Hama and Homs, cementing the end of Assad’s regime within 12 days. While HTS ally Turkey was said to have gave tacit approval for the operation, even Ankara was surprised at the speed at which the rebels advanced towards the capital as government forces seemed to all but melt away.
While this may seem like another military operation on the surface, the fall of Assad is a culmination of decades of unhappiness brewing amongst the locals. Statues of Hafez al-Assad, Assad’s father and former Syrian president have been toppled, crowds have gathered to pray in mosques and celebrate publicly. As the gates to Saydnaya prison were thrown open, large crowds have rushed in to find their loved ones, many of whom have endured torture under the most hellish conditions for years. The people’s jubilation is a natural expression of ultimate freedom from difficulties and sufferings endured over the past decade. Evidently, there is no one else to blame other than Assad for his poor leadership.
Nonetheless despite Assad’s departure, the HTS has proclaimed that public institutions are expected to function as per usual under Prime Minister al-Jalali as the country transitions into a new era of leadership.
Putin: Friend or Foe
However, critics argue that the fall of Assad’s regime is also contributed by Russian refusal to support resistance against the rebels. Putin has been a long standing supporter of Assad’s regime in the Syrian Civil War, with the Assad regime creating a significant source of power for Putin in the Middle East. Despite this, Putin made a decisive move to instead stay away from the conflict and allow Assad to fall. Simply put, Assad’s own men had no support to put up a fight and soon threw in the towel and abandoned their posts.
Putin’s decision may perhaps be a necessary evil that Russia needs at this point. Apart from the endless amounts of resources the Kremlin continues to pump into the Ukraine conflict, the Middle East region has shown no signs of a possible turn around for Assad. Iran and Lebanon, strong supporters of Assad, are fighting battles of their own as Israel continues to tackle the region’s strongest rebel force, Hezbollah. And over a decade of strong resistance against Assad’s regime since the Arab Springs Revolution clearly shows no opportunity for Assad to regain the popular support from the people. Cutting their losses was the best option at this point.
Nonetheless, Putin’s interest in the regime continues. With some of the most strategically important outposts located in Syria, it is speculated that Putin has struck a deal with the HTS rebel forces instead, allegedly allowing Assad’s regime to fall in exchange for the maintenance of their military bases.
A Turn of Fortunes
Assad’s abrupt departure has led to a remarkable shift in the balance of power across the Middle East. Iran and Russia are naturally poised to emerge as the losers of this development. The infamous Axis of Resistance - a network of proxies in the region meant to keep archenemy Israel at bay - is on the verge of collapse as Iran bids goodbye to the land bridge through which it channeled an assortment of arms and equipment that helped to prop up its Lebanese proxy Hezbollah. The abrupt departure of Assad has effectively laid bare the fragility of the axis and the various proxies’ dependence on Iranian (and Russian) military assistance. Traditionally, Iran’s defense doctrine has relied upon the axis to deter Israel’s attacks as the line of first defense. With its weakness exposed, Tehran may be forced to fall back on weaponizing its nuclear programme instead, an ominous indicator of greater instability ahead.
Ankara’s Wish List
Who will emerge to fill the regional power vacuum left behind by the despot’s downfall? Undoubtedly, any analysis is incomplete without an examination of Syria’s neighbor up north, Turkey (Türkiye). Once hosting Assad’s family for a holiday at a Turkish resort back in 2009, Turkish president Erdogan’s relationship with the dictator quickly soured in the months after the Arab Spring protests rocked Syria in 2011 as the latter’s security forces ordered repeated crackdowns on demonstrators against Turkey’s advice. Over the years, Erdogan has supported a coalition of anti-Assad militias and rebel groups through the provision of military training and arms while welcoming over 3 million Syrian refugees displaced by Assad’s heavy-handed rule and ensuing civil war.
Chief among these groups is the HTS, which has administered the northwestern city of Idlib since 2017. Turkish military forces stationed in Idlib gave the stability that allowed the HTS to establish its rebel rule without significant challenge from Syrian government forces while international aid flows facilitated by Ankara to the region have greatly improved locals’ perception of the rebel force. With Assad gone, Erdogan is expected to cash in on his contentious foreign policy. By effectively wielding its influence over the HTS, Ankara hopes to play a part in moulding the new Syrian government to one that keeps Turkey’s interests in mind. One primary concern is the presence of the People's Defense Units (YPG), a Kurdish-majority armed group that operates in northern Syria. The fall of Assad saw Turkey launch a military operation aimed at disarming Kurdish fighters. Ankara views the YPG as essentially an extension of the Kurdistan Workers’ Party (PKK), a guerilla group that has spearheaded a four-decade campaign for an autonomous Kurdistan carved out of Turkey. As a result of its brutal tactics that include multiple suicide bombings, summary executions and civilian massacres, PKK is designated as a terrorist group by Turkey and the US. Erdogan himself has compared the YPG fighters to Islamic State jihadists and declared that neither has a future in post-Assad Syria. However, complicating matters is the fact that the YPG (that forms the bulk of the Syrian Democratic Forces, SDF) has enjoyed extensive logistics support from the US since 2014 in its ongoing fight against the Islamic State. Moreover, the YPG works with coalition partners in the US-led coalition to guard captured Islamic State fighters and their families in various detention centers in northeastern Syria. Amidst growing concerns that Ankara’s campaign would target these detention centers (and indirectly permit the escape of captured militants), the US has brokered a brief ceasefire between Turkish forces and the YPG/SDF that was later denied by the Turkish defense ministry as of 19 December.
Syrian Refugees - A Grim Future
In the meantime, hosting millions of Syrian refugees has proven politically unpopular in a nation grappling with its own economic crisis (annual inflation rates have exceeded 50%) and anti-immigrant rhetoric has taken center stage in the elections last year. Both Lebanon and Turkey, neighboring nations that currently host large numbers of refugees, have renewed calls on individuals to return home as soon as practically possible, citing a strain on national resources. Wealthier nations in Europe are already reconsidering their stance on processing Syrian refugee asylum applications in the immediate days after Assad’s downfall. Across Western Europe, clashes over immigration policies have directly fueled the rise of far-right parties on election day as xenophobia sentiments exploded following the influx of migrants in 2015. In a sign of unusual haste, Austria has announced an unprecedented “return bonus” of €1000 for refugees already in the country to return home while several other EU member states have swiftly declared a halt in ongoing asylum procedures for Syrians even as the European Commission mentioned that “the conditions are not met for safe, voluntary, dignified returns” as yet. While Europe seems exceedingly eager to rid themselves of a highly inconvenient issue, forcibly repatriating Syrians in the short term is clearly infeasible given the large proportion of destroyed or otherwise inhabitable civilian infrastructure across the nation after years of raging armed conflict.
An Uneasy Calm in Damascus
Meanwhile in the Syrian capital, an uneasy calm has settled. President of the opposing forces Hadi al-Bahra has called for the establishment of a 18-month transition period that includes 6 months for the drafting of a new constitution while Mohammed al-Bashir (previously head of the HTS government in Idlib) has been named as the caretaker prime minister in the meantime. In interviews with international media, HTS leader Abu Mohammed al-Jolani (alias Ahmed al-Sharaa) has taken pains to cut ties with his jihadist past and insisted that his new regime would embrace pluralism and respect women's rights, citing his experience leading the rebel government in Idlib. However, many in the West are doubtful despite al-Jolani’s claims and have largely adopted a wait-and-see approach. In a brief glimmer of hope, the US has agreed to lift a $10m bounty on his head after a US delegation visited earlier for what was described as productive talks during which the HTS offered assurances that the Islamic State would not be permitted to regroup in Syria. Even so, much of how the HTS will actually rule Syria remains unknown at this point.
International Involvement
Amidst the uncertainties of the post-Assad transition, the relevancy of UNSC Resolution 2254, a 2015 document that outlines a roadmap for an inclusive political transition has been called into question. Penned nearly a decade ago, UNSCR 2254 calls for the establishment of a secular government as well as free and fair elections supervised by the UN. Back then, rounds of peace talks in Geneva collapsed in acrimony as Assad representatives refused to make any real concessions and negotiations were eventually suspended in 2016 after the opposition boycotted the talks entirely. The resultant deadlock next saw the establishment of the Astana process, a trilateral forum by Russia, Turkey and Iran. That too made little progress in de-escalation and instead served as a mechanism for its 3 sponsors to trumpet their own agendas in the war zone. Unsurprisingly, one of the rare points all could find common ground on back then was the need to curtail Kurdish military ambitions in the region. Back in the present day, it remains to be seen if the HTS would acquiesce to the presence of international observers or restart the peace process under UN auspices. Regardless of who facilitates the next round of talks, the process must be "Syrian-led and Syrian-owned" as described by US Secretary of State Antony Blinken to avoid following in neighbor Lebanon's footsteps and creating a fragile, dysfunctional government built upon a delicate sectarian balance.
As the effects of the despot’s downfall will undoubtedly reverberate for years to come, the world watches in hope that Syria does not become the next Libya.
*As the situation remains highly fluid, information within this article is taken to be accurate as of 22 December 2024.
References
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