DO NOT TRAVEL. The warning by the State Department puts it succinctly, urging all to defer travel to Haiti and for those within Haiti, to leave as soon as practically possible. Wracked by a devastating earthquake in 2010, Haiti has only suffered further in the years due to the consecutive failures of multiple international efforts at re-establishing political and economic stability in the nation of 11 million.
Up to 80% of the capital Port-au-Prince has fallen under gang control. Pictured here is Jimmy 'Barbecue' Chérizier, notoriously named for allegedly burning his opponents alive. Image Credits: The Guardian
Even at the time of Moïse’s assassination, a mere 10 senators remained as the administration edged precipitously close to collapse (even the terms of these 10 expired in Jan 2023). Meanwhile, acting Prime Minister Ariel Henry reneged on his promise to hold long-delayed elections and was himself forced out of office while negotiating for the deployment of a multinational police force led by Kenya to stabilize the security situation. The political vacuum has culminated in a loose coalition of armed gangs establishing their turf over vast swathes of the capital city Port-au-Prince and surrounding regions, killing and kidnapping largely with impunity. Escalating gang violence has swiftly plunged the impoverished nation (the national poverty rate exceeds 80%) into an atmosphere of Kempeitai-style terror. Outnumbered, underpaid and outgunned, the Haitian National Police could only watch as rival gangs relentlessly clashed over territory - the United Nations Integrated Office in Haiti documented 2,505 victims of killings and injuries attributed to gang violence in January to March 2024 alone. March also saw gangs overrun Haiti’s main international airport and 2 large jails, freeing thousands of inmates (many of whom had gang affiliations) onto the street. With street battles on a near-daily basis and the dysfunction of state institutions from healthcare to the criminal justice system, Haiti undoubtedly fits the textbook definition of a failed state.
UNSC Resolution 2699
Led by Kenya, the Multinational Security Support (MSS) Mission in Haiti is an international effort largely funded by the US and endorsed by the United Nations Security Council (UNSC) to restore some semblance of order. After months of delays, the first 2 batches of Kenyan police officers arrived in June/July 2024 and will bolster the Haitian National Police’s depleted ranks. More personnel from 6 other countries are expected to be deployed in the coming months. Even as their arrival has coincided with a reduction in gang violence, the lull is likely temporary as gangs consolidate their territory and adopt a “wait and see” approach. The Kenyans are expected to face an uphill battle ahead as foreign intervention is viewed with suspicion by many Haitians, given the checkered record of the previous UN peacekeeping forces. For instance, the United Nations Stabilisation Mission in Haiti (MINUSTAH) ending in 2017 was ensnared in multiple sexual assault scandals and gave rise to a deadly cholera outbreak. The Kenyans themselves have a controversial history of using excessive force - troops fired upon and killed multiple civilians in Nairobi protesting against proposed tax hikes on 25 June, coincidentally the day of the deployment of the first contingent in Haiti. A key difference this time lies in the role that the troops are expected to play. Instead of serving as a replacement for the beleaguered Haitian police, the MSS will complement the Haitian police. Indeed, the Kenyans have largely patrolled alongside their HNP counterparts thus far. “He is like my brother, like my relative,” Kenyan police official and MSS commander Godfrey Otunge describes his close working relationship with the new director general of the Haitian National Police, Rameau Normil, emphasizing that the nature and scope of the MSS significantly differs from previous peacekeeping missions under UN auspices.
Transitional Council: For Haitians, By Haitians
Change is afoot with the appointment of the transitional government council, a plan proposed by regional bloc CARICOM and currently led by interim Prime Minister Garry Conille. Already, Conille’s government has been credited with power-sharing, a rarity given the fractious nature of Haitian politics. The council is made up of representatives from the various political parties/coalitions, of which 4 will take turns leading the council and rotate every 5 months. Merely days after the deployment of the Kenyans, infamous gang leader Jimmy Cherizier has remarkably changed his tone, calling for national dialogue and even proposing a strategy to “lay down arms” despite having issued a defiant warning months ago in March. Though no concrete timeline has been issued as of yet, Conille has also promised to hold long-delayed elections by February 2026 - while easier said than done, it is certainly a step in the right direction. While the US expects that a free and fair vote would allow Haiti to emerge from the ongoing crisis, the extensive constitutional reforms required may be simply beyond Conille’s government. In a nation ranking in the bottom 10 of Transparency International’s Corruption Index, efforts by Conille’s government to hold elections amidst such a fragile political landscape are almost doomed to fail in its present state. Moreover, the tenuous peace currently upheld by the members of the transitional council is likely to collapse closer to the actual election date.
A possible solution is the involvement of the international community (such as CARICOM, that put forward the original proposal to establish Conille’s transitional council) in aiding and supervising the election process. One can refer to an example of largely successful international involvement, set decades ago in Cambodia. The United Nations Transitional Authority stepped in at the end of the Cambodian-Vietnam War to effectively administer an independent state for approximately 2 years. It was credited with holding the first democratic elections for the Cambodian people in almost 4 decades. However, such an extensive form of foreign intervention will inevitably be highly unpopular in the eyes of the Haitian populace. Worse still, it may reopen old wounds from MINUSTAH.
Haiti is once again a laboratory for international intervention. While hope may be on the horizon, only time will truly tell if the MSS will live up to expectations.
References
Africanews. (2024, July 6). *Haiti gang leader calls for dialogue as Kenyan police patrol the streets*. https://www.africanews.com/2024/07/06/haiti-gang-leader-calls-for-dialogue-as-kenyan-police-patrol-the-streets/
AP News. (2024, March 11). *Haiti council gangs prime minister*. https://apnews.com/article/haiti-council-gangs-prime-minister-92556924a8761df2e002db997d967ddd
BBC News. (2024, March 12). *Gang demands to be on negotiating table*. https://www.bbc.com/news/articles/c722xe8nzx5o
Brookings. (2024, March 13). *Why Kenya’s deployment won’t solve all of Haiti’s problems*. https://www.brookings.edu/articles/why-kenyas-deployment-wont-solve-all-of-haitis-problems/
CNN. (2024, August 10). *Haiti MSS operation base*. https://edition.cnn.com/2024/08/10/americas/haiti-mss-operation-base-intl-latam/index.html
France24. (2024, March 21). *Talks on transitional council in Haiti progress amidst gang violence*. https://www.france24.com/en/americas/20240321-talks-on-transitional-council-in-haiti-progress-amidst-gang-violence
SIPRI. (1995). *Cambodia: Legacy and lessons of UNTAC*. https://www.sipri.org/publications/1995/cambodia-legacy-and-lessons-untac
The Conversation. (2024, March 10). *Haiti’s revolutionary and intellectual history has lessons for the future*. https://theconversation.com/haitis-revolutionary-and-intellectual-history-has-lessons-for-the-future-164140