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Geopolitics in Asia Minor: An analysis of Turkey/Syria

The 21st century has seen its fair share of crises, and it would not be a surprise if the only things that people can recall about recent years is how they have had to adapt to all the issues currently plaguing the world. Regardless, 2023 is no exception, and today we will be focusing on a crisis that occurred just at the beginning of February, the Turkey-Syria earthquake. More specifically, we will be addressing the incident, its aftermath and the big question that this crisis has brought into the light: how far should the world let geopolitics affect humanitarian efforts?


Image Credits: REUTERS / Thaier Al-Sudani


A quick rundown of the facts so far: the 2023 Turkey-Syria Earthquake occurred on 6th February, where an earthquake of magnitude 7.8 struck Southern and central Turkey, along with Northern and Western Syria, which was followed up 9 hours later with a second 7.7 magnitude earthquake. This has been considered the fifth deadliest earthquake of the 21st century. After the dust settled and aftershocks faded away, casualties have ranged in the tens of thousands, with many more individuals having been uprooted from their homes and billions worth of property damage. A tragedy would be putting it mildly. Regardless, the world has scrambled to send the necessary aid for search and rescue operations. Humanitarian aid pledges have also flooded in from all corners of the world.


However, there has been a distinct difference in the amount of aid being sent to Turkey and Syria, a conundrum largely tied to the current unstable political climate of Syria. Of course, one could argue that more aid is necessary to properly address the greater issues Turkey is facing, such as the lax building regulations that had contributed to the collapse of 85000 buildings that could not endure the earthquake, even after a similar occurrence in 1999 forced the country to relook its seismic codes. On the other hand, this does not excuse the admittedly lackluster efforts to assist Syria, especially in the days immediately following the earthquakes.


So, what exactly happened?


First sparked by regional instability as part of the Arab Spring, the Syrian Civil War that began in 2011 continues till this day. Rattled by the sight of millions taking to the streets in neighboring countries, Syrian president Assad embarked on a series of steps to tighten his grip on power. When the wave of civil unrest did envelop Syria in time to come, the Assad regime swiftly rolled out a sprawling network of detention centers and prisons that ensnared any and all opposition. To worldwide horror, the most egregious human rights abuses were routinely committed as Assad’s henchmen serving in the Syrian government forces brutally clamped down on protestors. Since then, the US Congress and successive presidents have established a series of sanction programs targeted at the Syrian government, penalizing any organization attempting to lend support to the Syrian government as part of a long-drawn attempt to force some degree of accountability on Assad’s heinous acts. As an unfortunate by-product of the sanctions, infrastructure in poor condition is common in Syria, where partially collapsed and structurally unsound buildings are rarely demolished due to a lack of funds. Various estimates have suggested that nearly half of Syria’s infrastructure is destroyed or otherwise dysfunctional, a sobering reality that would only worsen after the earthquakes.


Damaged Infrastructure piling up in Turkey as a result of the earthquake

Image Credits: Middle East Institute


What has contributed the most in the struggle to provide effective relief efforts is the fragmented state of Syria, with regions under the control of the various factions that exist. The last rebel-held enclave (the Idlib region in the country’s North-West) has been one of the hardest-hit territories in the country, having to provide for millions of refugees while dealing with the Syrian government’s policies of besieging North-West Syria. The precarious political situation has choked off aid supplies to the region, with many countries hesitant to send support or unable to do so due to the closed checkpoints and opposition. Further undermining efforts is the Syrian government’s resistance to aid being sent to this region, especially since it might help rebel efforts and reduce its chances of finally seizing control of Idlib.


While one might argue that the Syrian Civil War should at the very least be put aside, even temporarily, in order to help the people caught up in the aftermath of the earthquakes, geopolitics is a messy business. The United Nations has to weigh the ramifications of lifting sanctions in order to accelerate the flow of economic aid against the significant possibility of Assad’s government seizing the chance to obtain funds and material assistance from its backers abroad. That being said, most sanctions that the Assad regime has been slapped with thus far mostly contain a humanitarian carveout clause, whereby the distribution of humanitarian aid is explicitly excluded from all said sanctions. Russia, a prominent enemy of the United States of America and its allies, has repeatedly used its veto power at the UN Security Council in order to limit the passage of humanitarian aid to Northwestern Syria to a single crossing. Despite the recent (9 Feb) announcement by the US on a 180-day exemption on sanctions to facilitate humanitarian aid efforts, the reality on the ground is far from encouraging. Most financial providers still shun the region due to the reputational risk and legal complexities involved. Further complicating the aid situation is Assad’s repeated demands for all humanitarian aid to be routed through and distributed by his government instead of via existing NGOs already working on the ground. Western allies have flatly denied the suggestion thus far, leaving the situation at an uneasy stalemate. Basic human decency tells us to put aside such differences in order to ensure that innocent civilians are given the assistance they so desperately need in order to recover from the earthquakes, and that whatever conflicts nations are currently fussing over can wait for a later date. And yet, considering the laggard relief efforts in Syria, it is abundantly clear that basic human decency is not exactly one of the top priorities of anyone involved.


As the dust slowly settles and the last-ditch rescue efforts are called off, a wave of reckoning has swept through Turkish president Recep Erdogan’s government. Strict building codes (enhanced after the 1999 İzmit/ Marmara earthquake) were meant to be followed. In the construction boom characterized by the Erdogan era, this was unfortunately only true on paper. In reality, scores of corrupt developers sought to cut corners to build housing in record time. Erdogan’s 2019 election campaign for the local elections centered around the president’s record achievement at eliminating housing shortages that plagued the country for decades, but conveniently swept a dirty issue under the rug - construction firms that flouted safety codes were given multiple amnesties and shielded from prosecution, permitting them to remain in business. As a result, the consequence is painfully apparent. When safety is compromised in favor of profit-maximizing firms, the people suffer. And suffer they did, with the death toll in Turkey alone surging past 44,000.


President Recep Erdogan delivering $50 billion plan for half a million new homes in September 2022 as part of his 2023 presidential bid

Image Credits: Ahval


With the presidential elections looming in June, Erdogan faces a difficult path ahead in what is already expected to be a very competitive race. On the other hand, bungling up the reconstruction effort will only risk further alienating the masses, especially those in the worst-hit provinces (the majority of whom are traditionally in the opposition camp). The concept of poetic justice would ring true - bolstered by campaign promises of enhanced national earthquake preparedness efforts that propelled him to the Turkish presidency in 2002, the same issue may serve as a reckoning for Erdogan come 2023.

References

Chulov , M., & Michaelson, R. (2023, February 19). Erdoğan faces backlash over building standards in city wrecked by quake. The Guardian. Retrieved from https://www.theguardian.com/world/2023/feb/19/erdogan-faces-backlash-over-building-standards-in-city-wrecked-by-quake

Gotev, G. (2023, February 9). Analysis: Earthquake in Syria offers leverage to isolated assad. www.euractiv.com. Retrieved from https://www.euractiv.com/section/global-europe/news/analysis-earthquake-in-syria-offers-leverage-to-isolated-assad/

Kepel, G. (2023, February 15). Will Turkey-Syria earthquake redraw the fault lines of geopolitics? Al-Monitor. Retrieved from https://www.al-monitor.com/originals/2023/02/will-turkey-syria-earthquake-redraw-fault-lines-geopolitics

Kumari, H. (2023, February 17). Turkey-Syria earthquake: Geopolitics, media coverage and gender. Feminism in India. Retrieved from https://feminisminindia.com/2023/02/17/turkey-syria-earthquake-geopolitics-media-coverage-and-gender/

Nagorski, T., & Labbate, M. (2023, February 17). World in photos: How Turkey's earthquake has punished Syria. Grid News. Retrieved from https://www.grid.news/story/global/2023/02/17/world-in-photos-how-turkeys-earthquake-has-punished-syria/

Ricard, P. (2023, February 7). After the earthquakes in Turkey and Syria, international aid is guided by geopolitics. Le Monde.fr. Retrieved from https://www.lemonde.fr/en/international/article/2023/02/07/after-the-earthquakes-in-turkey-and-syria-international-aid-is-guided-by-geopolitics_6014702_4.html

Syrian Network for Human Rights. (2023, January 9). Russia’s Veto Blocking UN Cross-Border Relief Aid is Unlawful an. Le Monde.fr. Retrieved from https://www.lemonde.fr/en/international/article/2023/02/07/after-the-earthquakes-in-turkey-and-syria-international-aid-is-guided-by-geopolitics_6014702_4.html -aim-seize-un-relief-aid-we-renew-our-years-long-call-putting-end-russias-exploitation-un-relief-aid

Ülgen, S. (2023, February 14). The politics of Türkiye’s earthquake. Carnegie Europe. Retrieved from https://carnegieeurope.eu/strategiceurope/89026


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