On 1 February 2021, the Burmese military – the Tatmadaw – arrested and replaced key members of the National Unity Government (NUG) by leveling charges against them that analysts deemed to be politically motivated and were intended to legitimize the Tatmadaw’s power takeover. The Junta swiftly established its own political cabinet, the State Administrative Council (SAC), under whose leadership various internationally-documented and condemned human rights atrocities were committed.
Founded in 2009, the Arakan Army is one of the dozens of Ethnic Armed Organisations waging an insurgency against the Tatmadaw. Images credits: Los Angeles Times
The Burmese military (or junta) in its various iterations has had a history of authoritarian rule ever since General Ne Win's 1962 coup. Violent clashes between the Tatmadaw and various ethnic insurgencies (or Ethnic Armed Organizations, EAOs for short) that were formed to counter military rule primarily in Northern and Northeastern Myanmar routinely erupted in the decades since. Over the years, the junta made few genuine attempts to reconcile with the various ethnic minorities even as their demands for greater autonomy grew. Accustomed to ruling with a heavy hand for 5 decades, the junta was understandably reluctant to hand over the reins of power to Aung San Suu Kyi's burgeoning democracy movement and insisted upon the condition that 25% of all seats in both the House of Nationalities and House of Representatives are reserved for military appointees since the beginning of democratic transition in 2011.
The 2020 election only further cemented the Tatmadaw's concerns with the NLD winning 83% of the total seats in parliament. As the proverbial straw that broke the camel's back, the junta finally launched the 2021 coup on Feb 1, putting an end to Burma's fledging transition to a democracy.
The Giant Neighbor Up North
Ultimately, no analysis of the Myanmar coup would be complete without first examining the junta's complex relationship with its giant neighbor up north, China. In the early days of the coup, China offered to help build an Internet firewall for the junta and export its surveillance technology to Myanmar to the alarm of many Western observers. Months after the coup, China held mutual ministerial visits with junta officials and resumed business engagements with Myanmar's various government ministries, in effect recognising and endorsing the junta's leadership. Yet in an abrupt about-turn, China has also supported Operation 1027, a rebel offensive led by the 3BTA that has seen the Tatmadaw suffer one of its heaviest losses till date.
While junta chief Min Aung Hlaing has visited close ally Russia multiple times since the coup unfolded, he has yet to set foot in Beijing - a telltale sign that the Tatmadaw’s relationship with China is far from rosy. In fact, China (as well as Russia) chose to abstain on a United Nations Security Council (UNSC) draft resolution demanding an end to violence in Myanmar instead of casting a veto as with previous drafts, paving the way for the landmark resolution to be adopted and bringing further international pressure on the junta to step down.
China’s displeasure also stems from the junta’s close ties to flourishing cyber-scam operations that primarily target Chinese citizens. From pig-butchering scams to cryptocurrency ‘investments’, border regions under junta control have played host to numerous scam compounds that lure unwitting job seekers from across Asia - victims of modern-day human trafficking, they are detained for months or even years, often suffering serious abuse at the hands of scam syndicates with close ties to the junta. Increasingly alarmed by the hotspot of syndicate activity at its doorstep, China has pressured the junta to crack down on such operations, largely to no avail. Unsurprisingly, 3BTA’s offensive has had the intended effect - Shan state’s Laukkaing, for instance, has seen the eradication of substantial cyber-scam operations since its recapture by the MNDAA.
China plays Mediator
Despite offering tacit approval for Operation 1027, China offered to mediate between the SAC and 3BTA representatives later on, securing a transient truce that was broken not long after. International observers have suggested that it is no coincidence for China’s stepped-up involvement given the passage of the BURMA Act by the US Congress - an act that authorizes the appropriation of funds for non-lethal aid to EAOs (but leaves the US foreign policy on Myanmar otherwise largely unchanged).
Ultimately, China’s foreign policy is driven primarily by economic interest. China has billions of dollars in Myanmar investments as part of the China-Myanmar Economic Corridor (CMEC) jeopardized by the prolonged instability. Part of China’s beleaguered Belt and Road Initiative, the CMEC offers China crucial access to the Indian Ocean and the Bay of Bengal via a new port in Kyaukphyu, thereby allowing it to reduce its dependence on the Straits of Malacca for the bulk of its trade flows. The coup derailed nascent negotiations by the previous NLD administration. While arrangements with local EAOs may allow certain projects to proceed, China is naturally expected to lend its support to whoever prevails in the long term in order to restore much-needed stability, SAC or otherwise.
An Uncertain Future
As for the resistance, sustaining the momentum to eventually topple the junta comes with fundamental challenges. Till date, the Tatmadaw has firm control over the major population centers of Yangon, Naypyidaw and Mandalay. Unless the junta’s control is weakened in these areas, displacing the junta will remain nothing but a pipe dream for the resistance movement. Moreover, the Tatmadaw’s ample resources means that the ongoing conflict can potentially drag on for years ahead even though the highly unpopular conscription drive announced in February 2024 led to an unprecedented exodus of youths unwilling to fight for the junta. Finally, the dozens of EAOs share few commonalities apart from a similar goal of displacing the junta and infighting is frequent as a result of vastly differing visions for a Myanmar without the junta, with tensions routinely erupting as EAOs clash over control of recently-liberated territory from the junta. Unsurprisingly, military coordination between many EAOs are severely limited, further hindering the efficiency of resistance operations on a whole.
A question remains: what will the future of Myanmar be when the junta is eventually replaced? A robust power-sharing agreement is seen as one of the more durable solutions - the federalist style of the US government as well as the devolved government of the UK (especially in the aftermath of the Good Friday Agreements) are examples of how the disparate interests of the various EAOs can be reconciled.
References
Asia Times. (2023, December 20). Still too early to write off Myanmar’s junta. Asia Times. https://asiatimes.com/2023/12/still-too-early-to-write-off-myanmars-junta/
Clapp, P. (2023, October 27). Operation 1027: Changing the tides of the Myanmar civil war. Brookings. https://www.brookings.edu/articles/operation-1027-changing-the-tides-of-the-myanmar-civil-war/
Rangappa, V. (2023, September 20). Myanmar’s junta doesn’t have to win, it just has to wait. Brookings. https://www.brookings.edu/articles/myanmars-junta-doesnt-have-to-win-it-just-has-to-wait/
United States Institute of Peace. (2023, December 10). China’s influence increases amid Myanmar’s instability. https://www.usip.org/publications/2023/12/chinas-influence-increases-amid-myanmars-instability
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